

Arab Spring and democratization theories

# Which mistakes were made by main actors of the Egyptian democratization process?

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## Introduction

In this study, I analyze the aftermath of the 2011 revolution in Egypt and I focus particularly on the reasons why the process of democratization ended up disappointing the original spirit of “Bread, Freedom and social Justice” expressed in Midan al-Tahrir<sup>1</sup>. I consider extremely important to figure out and to investigate the reasons of this failure, because all the parties involved, who did not properly contribute to the success of a democratization dynamic, should analyze what they did wrong. Many of the institutions inherited their social, political and economic role from the previous authoritarian rule and they were not able or willing to modify their prerogatives in the new incoming order. Many made mistakes without awareness, others behaved with the intention of sabotaging the process.

This paper positions itself in an area of study at a crossroad of different disciplines, like democratization processes, state building, Islamic parties in a democratic setting and their relationship with power, Muslim Brothers’ political engagement, rentier states (or semi-rentier as Egypt) and democracy, economic power of the army, external intervention in the Middle East region. This paper touches most of these aspects and how they played out in Egypt between 2011 and 2013. It focuses on the mistakes that happened in the Egyptian process and it does it with a strongly simplified structure.

The first chapter proposes a simple reading of the historical events of these revolutionary years and of the institutional progress made, by identifying the key actors and their behavior. The second chapter introduces the democratization studies to create a theoretical background of this process; in this way, the Egyptian attempt of pursuing a regime change is seen in a wider spectrum of transitional processes.

Then the analysis of the mistakes sets in. Using a scientific article by Diane Vaughan appeared in 1999 in the Annual Review of Sociology dedicated to “the dark side of organizations”, I build a framework of analysis and then I apply it to the previously discussed actors. This framework highlights the misconduct and mistakes (respectively intentional and unintentional mistakes in broad sense) of these parties, meant as behaviors not conformal to the task expected by their role in the democratic process.

The conclusion puts this analysis in the perspective of the Revolutions in the modern world and summarize which lesson can and must be learned. The lessons from this kind of retroactive analysis would be very useful for all actors involved, like Islamist parties, scholars and for any citizen caring about democracy and willing to take an active role in the democratization of his own country.

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<sup>1</sup> Arabic name of the main Cairo square, also Liberation or Martyr Square, epicenter of the Arab Spring in Egypt

## **Chapter 1 The aftermath of the revolution**

This chapter introduces the main actors of the revolution.

Many of them are now disappointed by the outcome of the process and only a few recognize the present political setting as positive. The Egyptian population on the contrary appreciate the order that the new Sisi's regime has brought, fear the social unrest even more than the lack of respect of democratic rules and probably care more for improving economy than for Tahrir ideals.

### **1.1 Was the revolution betrayed?**

The Egyptian revolution started on January 25, just a few days after the Yasmine revolution of Tunisia had inaugurated what is now known as the Arab Spring. People concentrated in the Midan al-Tahrir, Cairo's main crossroad square, and expressed their disconformity with the Mubarak's regime. The demonstrations increased slowly their scope and from economic and political reforms protesters started to claim values like social justice and dignity and at the end the fall of the regime. The absence of repression by the police, the security apparatus and the army<sup>2</sup>, allowed an unexpectedly rapid success of the demonstrators. Liberals, Socialists, Nasserists, Islamists were all united, they somehow seemed to reach an agreement with the security forces, and this brought Mubarak to leave office in February. The extremely positive spirit of this social movement seemed to inaugurate a transition to a more respectful system, favorable to individual liberties.

Nevertheless, demonstrators did not wish to seize the power directly, as they only wanted to set a new political scene<sup>3</sup>. As soon as the old despotic regime fell though, the fragile alliance that had been formed on the barricades started a process of rebalancing. The unity of purposes diminished and each individual group started to work its own agenda, initially to prepare for elections and the inauguration of a democratic regime.

Since no political organism was created in Tahrir, except for embryonic unions and political parties, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), under Sadat and Mubarak a military consultative commission, was almost unanimously accepted as leader of a temporary government. Later other conservative forces rose to power, like the Muslim Brothers and the judiciary and a peculiar situation came up, where conservative forces, where supposed to protect the revolution<sup>4</sup>.

### **1.2 Main actors of the Egyptian Spring**

Instead of a diachronic analysis of the revolution, I present in this section the main actors of the revolution, whose behavior will be put under investigation in chapter 2.

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<sup>2</sup> see E. Bellin (2012) pages 131 to 136

<sup>3</sup> see O. Roy (2012) page 2

<sup>4</sup> see Atef Said (2012) page 413, and his article "The Paradox of Transition to 'Democracy' under Military Rule"

### 1.2.1 The army

The army has been at least since the Free Officers Movement of the early 50ies very powerful in Egypt. All three Presidents (Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak) were previously generals and all of them could lean on the support of the armed forces in fighting their battles or keeping society at bay. In exchange, the army obtained a huge economic power from the Presidents, so important and so diversified that the army controls between 5 and 40% of the Egyptian economy<sup>5</sup>. As Eva Bellin remarks, when protests became so massive, a military intervention on the Tahrir crowd became almost impossible, but there are speculation about why did the army let Mubarak fall<sup>6</sup>.

As a self-proclaimed guarantor of stability, the army orchestrated the post-revolutionary process and we can now perceive how careful it was in preventing any alternative force to grow and challenge its predominance<sup>7</sup>. The SCAF was relatively free to settle two main issues that had caused discussions among Egyptians<sup>8</sup>, by setting the electoral timetable and by approving an interim Constitution, modified arbitrarily without any kind of transparency. One of the most astute move of the SCAF was designing the timing of the elections and the writing of the Constitution, in a way that its power would have kept undiscussed at least until a President would have been elected.

As Atef Said points out main target of the army was to establish a “conditional form of democracy”, one that does not put into discussion its social and economic capital and does not change dramatically the previous system. Even if they were supposed to be a balanced power guaranteeing a peaceful transition to democracy after Mubarak, the army recurred to an increased level of repression with the clear intention to simply stop the revolutionary spirit and *de facto* starting a counter-revolutionary process.

Many Egyptians though by this time had bought the narrative of the army and even if the strong protests persisted, it did not translate into a strong political representation of revolutionaries in Parliament. On the contrary, the only force that grew to challenge against the army in the November 2011 to January 2012 parliamentary elections, were the Islamic parties and among them the Muslim Brothers and its newly created political party.

In this second phase the army had to make new alliances. Initially they approached the Muslim Brotherhood, united by a similar vision on social order. When their agenda started colliding though, the army allied with the Supreme Court and had the Low Chamber dissolved, by declaring illegal the way many candidates had been elected, particularly Brothers. Even if tolerating the raise to power of Morsi and some of his moves like the army’s leadership reshuffle, by firing Tantawi and calling Sisi to power, the army developed a raising critical approach to him, that finally led to his oust in July 2013.

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<sup>5</sup> see Marshall S. and Stacher J. (2012). <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer262/egypts-generals-transnational-capital>

<sup>6</sup> among others the army refusal of accepting Gamal Mubarak, extraneous to the army, as successor to his father

<sup>7</sup> see YILDIRIM (2013) page 62-65

<sup>8</sup> see Atef Said (2012) page 399

The 3<sup>rd</sup> of July coup sanctions the end of the revolution.

### 1.2.2 the Muslim Brotherhood

The other conservative force, that somehow appropriated the revolution is the Muslim Brotherhood. This Islamic charity created in 1928 has permeated the whole Egyptian society by providing social services and assistance mainly to the poor, under the motto “Islam is the solution”. Even if its political role was not well accepted by the regime, the Brothers managed to participate in some elections, and after their success in 2005, when Bush pressured Mubarak, to hold freer elections, they started to be perceived as the main opposition to the National Democratic Party<sup>9</sup>. Thanks to its proximity with the people and its logistical capability, that became evident both in taking care of the Tahrir protesters and in the political campaigning after the fall of Mubarak, the newly formed Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) was the clear winner of the Parliamentary elections of 2011- 2012, and soon later Morsi became the first Egyptian President in 2012 elected democratically.

At this stage, all eyes worldwide were on one of the first Islamic parties able to seize the power in the Arab world, a possibility that had been prevented repeatedly in the past, like the FIS in Algeria or Hamas in the Palestinian Authority. All previous political role of the Muslim Brotherhood had happened in a semi- authoritarian setting, and even if they perform a very constructive opposition role in the Parliament<sup>10</sup>, that could not clarify how they would behave in a democratic environment. Would the outcome bring an Islamic approach to the social and political life, similar to the Iranian *al wilayat al fakih*, or a *sharia* dominated archaic ruling as Saudi Arabia, or on the contrary would it bring up a system more similar to Turkey or even a new form of Western style democracy<sup>11</sup>?

Although the MB was often not considered a democratic organization in itself<sup>12</sup>, it pretended to have made progress in this aspect too. After the 2005 major success, even if the Mubarak’s regime started a violent repression, the Brotherhood took many steps towards transparency of its political role, like publishing more formal electoral programs and discussing publicly a political platform, even if under strong criticism.

Under these circumstances the Muslim Brothers went from discussing the possibility of giving up their political role and dedicate all efforts to the religious task of preaching (*da’wa*), to seizing the control of Parliament and Presidency in a few years of time lapse. Some voices inside the Brotherhood, like Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and Mohammed Habib pushed it to moderate positions, but they were soon forced out of the organization. The radical approach of Morsi and al Shateer prevailed, who developed the Brotherhood into an integrated organization with the party not a separate entity.

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<sup>9</sup> see N. J. Brown (2012) page 186

<sup>10</sup> see N. J. Brown (2012) page 92

<sup>11</sup> see YILDIRIM (2013) page 61

<sup>12</sup> see A. Pargeter (2013) page 36

Issues like financing the party with donation moneys, favoring the right wings, creating an internal militia, disregarding the political opposition but also running for Presidency and coming to terms with army, judiciary and security forces (police and *muhabbarat*) instead of challenging them, show that the Brotherhood did not strive to become a democratic entity, but to reach power.

The year of Morsi's presidency is a clear example of how the Brotherhood to push its own agenda, disregarded a solution of dialogue with the forces of the revolution, by eliminating any spirit of communal effort to build a new democratic state and especially neglecting the mottos of the revolution. "Bread, Liberty, Social Justice and Dignity" were all rapidly forgotten under Morsi, when violence and repression came back and were covered by the new President instead of punished.

Instead the FJP seemed to push for an *Ikhwanization*<sup>13</sup> of the state, focusing on appointing only trustworthy people to key positions in administration, army, state media, even Shura and Constitutional assemblies, keeping the emergency law and military trials of civilians in place, trying to radicalize *Al Azahr*, the National Council of Human Rights and even the education system and fighting relentlessly against press freedom<sup>14</sup>.

Morsi himself was also responsible of unfortunate degeneration in communicating with the public<sup>15</sup>, initially he appeared frank and close to the public, but he turned later aggressive and threatening when he felt cornered and hindered in pushing his agenda. In November 2012, feeling strong by his successful mediation between Hamas and Israel in Gaza, he advocated to himself with a Presidential decree unlimited power. Even if the decree was supposed to be only temporary with the aim of protecting the Constitution from attacks of the judiciary<sup>16</sup> and it was soon suspended, this all process convinced most Egyptian that Morsi by drafting a self-serving constitution was consolidating a new autocracy, instead of building a democracy. In the subsequent difficult environment, Morsi relied on radical, sectarian and divisive rhetoric to rally right-wing supporters, was not able to move to an inclusive discourse and to avoid creating a culture of oppression and fear.

During the 6 more months that Morsi stayed in power, the battle for democracy was already lost and the social discontent increased because of the failure of his progress in economic and political matters, as shown by the Morsi Meter<sup>17</sup>, measuring the not kept promises. The President searched more for the internal backing of the Brotherhood than for a possible cooperation with opposition or any other external parties.

<sup>13</sup> see Khalifa Isaac (2012) page 2-3, for a detailed description of the main aspects of this policy

<sup>14</sup> see Bradley Hope (2012) for the crackdown on al Doustour, Fareen TV and al Bernameg  
<https://www.thenational.ae/uae/morsi-is-sacrificing-free-speech-to-prevent-criticism-egyptian-media-1.412191>

<sup>15</sup> see Bassiouni (2017) chapter 8.2 and conclusions

<sup>16</sup> see Basseem Sabry's article for al Monitor on November 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2012 <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al-monitor/morsi-decree-constitution-power.html>

<sup>17</sup> see Olga Khazan's article for the Atlantic on July 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2013  
<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/why-egyptians-are-so-unhappy-with-morsi-in-one-chart/277511/>

*Tamarod* was organized by opposition forces and protests erupted continuously. By the end of June, millions of Egyptians chanting “Morsi is Mubarak” strongly supported the army’s intervention to end the dictatorship of the Muslim Brotherhood.

### 1.2.3 Other Islamic forces

The Muslim Brotherhood has been for a long time the source of almost all Islamic organizations in Egypt, even the more violent. More recently a very strong activism from Saudi Arabia has provoked an increase of Salafi and *Wahabi* adepts, who also mobilized politically by setting up the *Al Nour* Party. They became the second major force in the new elected Parliament, also constituted an important minority in the Constitutional Assembly and constantly pushed the FJP towards a more radical reading of the Coran, the introduction of a *sha’ria* approach into the Egyptian legislation and measures discriminating women<sup>18</sup> and Copts. They left the Morsi’s camp in 2013 and support the military coup, although it is not clear where they stand politically since then.

Much more moderate were some political figures like Fotouh and Habib who had been forced out from the Brotherhood for their vision of Islamic rules. *Al Futouh* ran for President in 2012 and supported moderating many aspects of the religion<sup>19</sup>, allowing the abjuration of the faith and favoring the strict separation of political arm and charity inside the Muslim Brother.

Among young Islamic voices, many bloggers activists influenced the new generations often with open minded, tolerant messages.<sup>20</sup>

One of the most important institutions in Egypt is the *Al Azahr*, one of the oldest study center of the Muslim world, who became moderate under the Mubarak’s regime. The Grand Imam Ahmed al Tayeb has been advocating human rights, liberty and also the separation of religious institutions from the state<sup>21</sup>, and never really wanted to be involved in political feud of the revolution aftermath.

### 1.2.4 Judiciary, Security apparatus and authoritarian forces

The Judiciary was not organized politically, but played an important role in the year of Morsi as President. Many of the judges inherited their position from the Mubarak’s time and even if some magistrates and lawyers were among the most combative adversaries of his regime since at least 1986, the category did not want to lose their prerogatives and power and therefore hindered changes. The Constitutional Court revoked the election of the Low Chamber and subsequently entered a power fight against the Muslim Brother, allying with

<sup>18</sup> see el Sheikh and Kirkpatrick’s news for AINA, on March 25<sup>th</sup>, 2013 <http://www.aina.org/news/20130326151838.pdf>

<sup>19</sup> see Yoram Meital’s article for Jerusalem Report on July 27<sup>th</sup>, 2013 and Trager report date April 4<sup>th</sup>, 2004, for The Washington Institute for Near East Politics <http://www.jpost.com/Jerusalem-Report/The-Region/Saving-the-Egyptian-revolution-319370>

<sup>20</sup> see Marc Lynch’ article for Foreign policy, on April 10<sup>th</sup>, 2013 - <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/10/did-we-get-the-muslim-brotherhood-wrong/>

<sup>21</sup> see O. Roy (2012) page 11

the army. It also forced Morsi to defend the Constitutional referendum at the end of 2012, with the famous “pharaoh decree”<sup>22</sup> to protect himself and the Constitutional Assembly from the attacks of Supreme Constitutional Court, historically anti- Islamist<sup>23</sup>. The judiciary also declared unconstitutional the electoral law that was supposed to appease protests during the Morsi year by calling new elections and precipitated the final crisis of the President by putting him in a political deadlock<sup>24</sup>.

The interference of authoritarian forces in the work of the Constitutional Assembly has been also a peculiar situation. The building of the Assembly was not universally approved nor accepted, the Muslim Brothers were able to give the majority of the 100 seats to representatives of Islamic parties and to non-politicized experts, with sympathy for the Brotherhood. The whole Constitutional Assembly work was not managed as expected and suggested by traditional literature, that sees the Constitutions a pact among all parties, result of a dialogue and respectful of all political and social spectrum. On the contrary many instances and organisms (judiciary, military, religious) were telling the Assembly their requests bypassing opposition groups in Parliament.

Other guardians of the old regime, like the security apparatus made of police and secret service (the *muhabbarat*), as Bellin notes in her study about coercive apparatus in Egypt<sup>25</sup> did intervene in the process defending partisan interests. When the protest wave reached critical mass, the security apparatus took a low profile, nevertheless intervening on a selective basis. When Morsi was elected president, the non-intervention and passive attitude of the forces of order made the safety situation worse increasing the general feeling that the Muslim Brothers were not able to keep the situation under control.

Almost only Mubarak’s family was put under trial, whereas all other elites of crony capitalists were not directly affected and were free to keep their businesses and even to run for elections in the Parliamentary under new political banners.

### 1.2.5 Revolutionary camp and civil society

Protests in Tahrir united a very wide spectrum of people, political activists but also apolitical Egyptians, who were mobilized initially for the feeling of desperation, growing since the financial crisis of 2008, and subsequently by the enthusiasm of sharing with other courageous protesters a social will and almost a missionary task of freeing Egypt from his authoritarian leadership. The success of this episode was later not properly managed by activists, who soon lost the control of the revolution, leaving army and later a conservative President in charge, both only pursuing private political programs. It is an extremely sad

<sup>22</sup> see S. Roll publication for the SWP, Berlin, on January 29<sup>th</sup>, 2013 [https://www.swp-berlin.org/kurz-  
gesagt/muhammad-morsi-in-berlin-was-ist-dran-an-der-kritik-am-aegyptischen-praesidenten/](https://www.swp-berlin.org/kurz-<br/>gesagt/muhammad-morsi-in-berlin-was-ist-dran-an-der-kritik-am-aegyptischen-praesidenten/)

<sup>23</sup> see Elmenhawy’s article for The HuffPost on November 30<sup>th</sup>, 2012 [https://www.huffingtonpost.com/mohamed-  
elmenhawy/morsi-constitution-draft\\_b\\_2261046.html](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/mohamed-<br/>elmenhawy/morsi-constitution-draft_b_2261046.html)

<sup>24</sup> see N. J. Brown (2012) page 50

<sup>25</sup> see E. Bellin (2012) pages 130-131

cultural loss that the community sense that was maturing in Midan Tahrir disappeared, especially because the young generation of bloggers and activists rooted in the social movements of the earlier years, as well as established journalists and comedians have been eliminated from the present Egyptian political life and forced into clandestinity<sup>26</sup>.

Paradoxically in the second round of the Presidential election, the revolutionary forces mostly endorsed the Islamist Morsi, because he was running against Ahmed Shafik, representing the Mubarak time<sup>27</sup>. Even under the assumption of Morsi being the least bad candidate, and the extremely low participation, this support gave him a certain legitimacy from the original protesters and to the revolutionary forces an uncomfortable feeling of co-responsibility. Together with the feeling of having been naïve, when hoping that army and Brothers would have kept the revolutionary spirit alive, the revolutionary camp and most participants to the protests like Liberals, Socialists, Nasserists, Communists, came out extremely weakened by the aftermath of the revolution. They had no time to organize new parties, and confirmed a marginal presence of previous elections winning altogether less than 100 of the 508 seats in the Parliament, split among several parties (the liberal New Wafd and Reform and Development, and the socialist Egyptian Bloc and Revolution Alliance). The timing of elections prevented them from opening political parties, campaigning, and being able of truly reach to people to be able to challenge the Islamist parties.

Also in the Constitutional assembly only less than one third of the members were not close to an Islamic position and only one fourth of the assembly walked out to protest the *Ikhwaniization*, damaging the image of the Constitutional process, but not preventing the final drafting later approved in a referendum and signed into law by Morsi, at the end of 2012. During 2013, the revolutionary forces united again, the Tamarud movement became extremely active in the society against Morsi and just hours before the military coup d'état the leaders of the opposition El Baradei, Amr Moussa and Hamdeen Sabahi issued a unified statement, to call for Morsi's resignation.

It was nevertheless too late, the army took the power and sanctioned de facto the end of the revolution.

### 1.2.6 Parliament and Constitutional Assembly

As soon as Mubarak resigned, discussions started about the timing of the steps to follow, and particularly if elections (of Low and High Chamber and Presidential) had to be called before or after writing the new Constitution. Most parties involved were moved by own calculations, to maximize their own success or interest. The power acquired by the SCAF let the military set the agenda by introducing some constitutional amendments and then hurry

<sup>26</sup> see Doaa Soliman and Ahmed Nour's article for BBC Monitoring "Egypt's revolutionaries - where are they now?" of January 25<sup>th</sup>, 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35401868>

<sup>27</sup> see Hellyer's Open Editorial for Brookings, on December 20<sup>th</sup>, 2012 <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/critiquing-morsis-egypt/>

to parliamentary elections. The elections were called without giving protesters time to set up own political parties and to campaign, even if they were postponed repeatedly from Summer 2011 to Winter 2012. Both Houses of the Parliament (the People's Assembly and the Shura Council) were elected with little legitimacy, with Islamic blocks easily winning the majority of seats. A few months later, just before Morsi was elected President, the Supreme Constitutional Court declared the vote unconstitutional and dissolved the lower House.

The Constitutional Assembly formed soon after the parliamentary elections was even less legitimized. The Islamic block held a majority of the 100 seats for themselves, liberal leftist social democratic forces only started to be represented after a second assembly was nominated and also then could not reach an agreement on many aspects. A very particular issue is that most institutions of the Egyptian judiciary, military and religious establishment started dealing directly with the Constitutional Assembly to reach their objectives. The progressive forces felt bypassed and ignored, they abandoned the assembly just few weeks before the Constitution was finished, clearly signing the lack of universal support to such an important document.

### **1.2.7 West and external powers**

Many other actors intervened in the process, external and internal, directly and indirectly, in favor or against the revolutionary camp.

I do not analyze these actors in this paper.

The West and particularly the US<sup>28</sup> have had a major interest and influence in the Egyptian history and so does Israel. Obama and his aides did not clearly support any particular group of revolutionaries, although it is more or less certain that initially they let Mubarak fall but subsequently backed Sisi's intervention.

Gulf countries and particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia have increasingly been meddling into Egyptian internal affairs, and even Russia and China were keeping a close look to the unfolding situation.

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<sup>28</sup> see Cofman Wittes's article for Brookings (dated February, 26<sup>th</sup> 2013) advocating more intense US intervention <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/egypt-two-years-after-the-revolutionwhere-egypt-stands-what-the-united-states-can-do/>

## **Chapter 2 Mistakes in the Egyptian attempt of Democratization**

After the early successes and Ben Ali's and Mubarak's resignations, the Arab Spring seemed to become a new phase of democratization remembering the fall of Berlin Wall and Soviet Union, that inaugurated the transition of most communist block to a democratic path.

Egypt had experienced already episodes of social protest in the past, but mostly with little scope and success<sup>29</sup>. In 2011, the size of the turmoil had dramatically increased and, differently than in the past, people were not taking the street under religious or political banners, to wish death to America or to protest Israeli politics. They mobilized to improve their own society, claiming to become more "westernized". It was an admission that their political system was the root of their own problem, and they started to fight for values generally associated with Western democracies, like social justice, freedom, dignity and respect for individuals rights.

Having met main actors of the Egyptian political process in chapter 1, a peek into the theories of democratization can give a sense of the normative difficulties that successful revolutions still encounter after overthrowing a dictator, in what Guillermo O'Donnell calls the second uncertain transition<sup>30</sup>. Only a shared interest by power groups in democracy can make such a second phase successful and we will see in the second section, that this aspect was missing in the Egyptian process.

### **2.1 Democratization and the state building process**

This section is dedicated to the studies of democratization and the theoretical approach to the transition process from authoritarian to democratic regimes. Key aspects of democracy and democratization must be understood, to perform the analysis of this paper.

#### **2.1.1 Theories of democratization**

Although democracy is an ancient term, Robert Dahl has established the modern approach to pluralist democracy in the early 60ies, by developing the idea of polyarchy<sup>31</sup>, where power is split and shared among multiple institutions and people.

At the same time, modernization studies<sup>32</sup> became widespread under the conviction that there was a certain necessary development of societies towards more openness, more welfare and automatically more democracy. In this environment, the transition paradigm became very popular inspired by earlier works of O'Donnell and Schmitter, forecasting that most states would have followed the Western model of democracy<sup>33</sup>.

The theory of democratization received a very strong impulse, when first Southern Europe, then Latin America and finally the communist regimes moved towards democracy.

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<sup>29</sup> see G. Aghina (2015) page 4- 6

<sup>30</sup> see G. A. O'Donnell (1994)

<sup>31</sup> see Dahl (1956)


<sup>32</sup> see Lipset (1959)

<sup>33</sup> see O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and particular the 4<sup>th</sup> volumes of their work about transitions (1986c)

These studies became almost a self-fulfilling prediction<sup>34</sup>, as the fame of this discipline discredited one-party dictatorial systems worldwide and put under pressure all neo-patrimonial and absolutist regimes<sup>35</sup>, forcing them at least to some political opening, precisely when the Washington consensus was imposing economic deregulation worldwide.

The stall of this process at the end of the XX century (see Chart 1) brought this optimism to an end and a more realistic vision of history's hiccups brought researchers attention to the set of conditions necessary for transitions to be successful<sup>36</sup>. Democratic institutions like elections of parliaments, writing of Constitutions and setting up of polyarchies do not guarantee a true democratic society. The scholars started recognizing the existence of many "hybrid" regimes as defined by Collier and Levitsky<sup>37</sup>, that were not democracies even if they had democratic institutions. Fareed Zakaria went a step further, writing about illiberal democracies, warning that even so-called democracy can bring negative consequences, such as nationalism, ethnic conflict and even war<sup>38</sup>.

Chart 1 – Larry Diamond page 143



The researchers started to focus on soft factors and analyze more aspects of the democratization process. The importance of the Constitution writing process to introduce a system of checks and balances and of power sharing is recognized as particularly delicate after a transition<sup>39</sup>. Economic justice becomes more and more of a central role but not anymore as trigger of democracy as in the modernization theories, more like a target of true democratic system, by policies of redistribution and development<sup>40</sup>. The importance of building strong states with solid institutions<sup>41</sup> and then to limit the actions of these same institutions with universal rule of law<sup>42</sup> is recognized to attain a democracy with high quality. Among institutions political parties and civil society organizations are recognized of central importance<sup>43</sup>.

<sup>34</sup> see Huntington and his theory about the third wave of democratization (1991).

<sup>35</sup> see M Bratto and, N. Van de Walle (1994) and their study about African states in transition.

<sup>36</sup> see Carothers (2002) and her critics of the transition paradigm.

<sup>37</sup> see Collier and Levitsky (1997) and the concept of "Democracies with adjectives"

<sup>38</sup> see F. Zakaria (1997) and the dilemma of a non-democratic party winning democratic elections

<sup>39</sup> see Samuels and Hawkins Wyeth (2006) writing about transitions after armed conflicts.

<sup>40</sup> see Przeworski and Limongi (1997); Rueschemeyer, Stephens, Stephens (1992); Fritz and Rocha Menocal (2007)

<sup>41</sup> see Whaites (2008) and his analysis of state building

<sup>42</sup> see Guillermo O'Donnell (2004) page 36, stating how important is that institutions abide to the rule of law.

<sup>43</sup> see Hans Daalder (2011)

Very useful for this research is the analysis of the dangers hidden in democratization steps, the fragility of democratizing states<sup>44</sup> and failures recorded. I particularly appreciate the theory expressed by Daron Acemoglu<sup>45</sup>, who instead of considering modernization as an automatic process, develops the idea of critical junctions, situations in which societies seem to choose to embrace democratic path, without an historicistic necessity.

All these considerations become central in theory of democratization and can give us also an input on which priorities the Egyptian process should have set, even if it never really had a chance to deal with these soft factors, mostly linked to the rule of law and to the rights of others to rise and limit everybody else's rights, including of the incumbent forces.

For my research, it is particularly important to note how the semi-authoritarian character of the Mubarak's regime was liable for some of the handicaps in the democratic development. The lack of knowledge of the political game and of the necessity of a true democratic dialogue among parties prevented a democratic transition. The institutions building was hindered by existing powers, not understanding how consensus and dialogue with opposition was necessary to start a successful transition.

### 2.1.2 Democratic attempts in Arab and Muslim states

Egypt is an Arab and mostly Muslim country, two specific characteristics that have been put under exam relative to democracy, since there are no Arab states and only a few with Muslim majorities considered democracies. Arab states seem to have been prone to authoritarian types of regime, many of them are rentier or semi-rentier, with strong army and security apparatus, coopted crony capitalism and other obstacles for democratic development like interference by Islamic elements in state affairs<sup>46</sup>.

In the 90ies there was a growing optimism that some Arab states were transitioning to democracy. Changes were appearing in many regimes, with open space to civil society, elections, parliaments, political parties but no place with a degree of political freedom or economic equality, similar to Western countries and Schlumberger<sup>47</sup> stopped the enthusiasm by asserting that those expectations were not really materializing.

The debate if Islam and democracy are irreconcilable is well alive. This is not the subject of this research but clearly the experiment of the Muslim Brotherhood in power in Egypt was an extremely important test of this theory. When the FJP and Ennahda reached the power in Egypt and Tunisia, they were expected to give important indications about the behavior of Islamic once seizing the power. The 2 cases evolved in such a different way that we are now even more puzzled. When facing a *critical juncture*, Ennahda chose a moderate

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<sup>44</sup> see Diamond (2015) page 148

<sup>45</sup> see Acemoglu et al (2007) page 1047

<sup>46</sup> see Diamond L. (2010) for an extensive analysis of possible reasons of Arab country "resiliency to democracy".

<sup>47</sup> see Schlumberger (2000) page 106, for his critical remarks of the idea that "something was moving" in the Arab world.

approach, whereas the Egyptian FJP under Morsi's leadership turned out incapable of dealing with a strong popular and institutional opposition in a democratic way<sup>48</sup>.

Professor Potrafke of the Konstanz University has demonstrated in "Islam and democracy" (2010) that according to most studies and following methodology like POLITY IV and Freedom House indices or the Democracy Dictatorship measure of political regime<sup>49</sup>, he can "confirm that countries with Muslim majorities are indeed less likely to be democratic". On the other side, there is growing awareness, that the whole discussion is set in an unfavorable term for the Muslim religion, which must demonstrate that it can accept democracy rules<sup>50</sup> and reach "twin" or mutual tolerations of democracy and religion<sup>51</sup> in a sort of skewed and biased debate. An important theory also considers that by including Islamic parties in the democratic game of winning majority of voters, they will automatically moderate their terms<sup>52</sup>. Many scholars have dedicated recent studies to comparing political Islam and political Catholicism, just to find out how illiberal and anti-democratic were the Catholic Church until at least the Second Council Vatican (1962- 1965).

Arab states themselves have been very wary of Islamic parties. The Emergency law in Egypt was in place since 1981, following Sadat's assassination, by an Islamic group linked like many to the Muslim Brothers themselves, and lasted until the aftermath of the revolution, due to several terrorist attacks. This is the main reason for strong distrust of Islamic organizations in Egypt and the prolonged illegality status of the Brotherhood.

## 2.2 Defining a "framework for mistake"

Using an article by Diane Vaughan appeared in 1999 in the Annual Review of Sociology dedicated to "the dark side of organizations", that defines Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster inside organizations, I have developed a framework of analysis and then used it in section 2.3 to analyze participants' behavior.

The article studies mistakes that happen in an organization, defined as a deviation of their behavior from the course expected by their official function. Mistake is a relative concept and can be intentional or not. Mistakes in broad sense are all type of violation of formal design goals and normative standards and expectations, whereas in narrow sense, they imply acts of omission or commission with negative social consequences, but without intentionality of harming society. Misconduct or also "white collar crime", consists of abuse of power or trust that turn into systematic production of organizational deviance and routine non-conformity. They are intentional mistakes and can become pathological by setting standard behavior.

<sup>48</sup> see Stepan and Linz (2013) pages 20-24

<sup>49</sup> see Potrafke (2010), Cheibub et al. (2010), Rowley and Smith (2009), Alvarez et al. (1996), Przeworski et al. (2000)

<sup>50</sup> see M. Driessen (2013) page 5.

<sup>51</sup> see Stepan (2000) page 37, speaking about "political institutions vis-a-vis religious authorities, and ... religious individuals and groups vis-a-vis political institutions"

<sup>52</sup> see N. J. Brown (2012), G. M. Tezcür (2010) and J. Schwedler (2011 and 2013) for the inclusion- moderation theory.

The article defines also the worst possible consequence of mistakes, the disaster or dramatic end of the organization due to inefficiency and internal turmoil.

We are focusing on democratization and therefore I consider as mistake every behavior of actors involved, counterproductive to the process of democratization. I would consider misconduct the explicit intention of one of these actors to harm the process. Because I consider the democratization as the desired outcome of the process, all behaviors with a different purpose, like maximizing a sectarian or corporative welfare, are automatically considered wrong and therefore either mistakes or misconduct.

Mistakes with different level of gravity happen in organizations especially because individuals involved do not clearly recognized their tasks or dot follow properly instructions. The objective of this study is to identify the behavior of actors that produced a “sub-optimal outcome” both because they did not know what their posts required them to do in a democratic environment and because they explicitly targeted private advantage different than the one of general interest.

If we had found a univocal social and political setting in the theory of democracies, that would have determined the correct behavior of all major institutions part of it, it would have also been easier to determinate which behaviors in the Egyptian Spring deviated from the proper ones. It would have been easier to point at the guilty party, association or organization. The reality is more complex and democracy is not a certain science or a univocal concept, so that this scientific analysis is not possible. Islamic parties for example would probably target a different scenario, in comparison with reactionary secular forces or revolutionary bloggers and still be included in the democratic discourse.

I have chosen to loosely consider the ideals of Tahrir as the term of paragon to assess the proper and rightful behavior of actors or vice-versa the deviation from the norm. This genuine spirit of the revolution would be what Diane Vaughan would define the routine of the organization, or also the organizational mission, that was supposed to drive the “production facility”. If the outcome was successful, all parties involved would have contributed to the correct democratization process and no major mistakes or deviation would have happened.

### **2.3 The Egyptian Spring under the “framework for mistake”**

This self-developed “mistake and misconduct analysis” follows the structure of the article by Diane Vaughan and applies the content systematically to the revolutionary events and actors. This section is structured on the 4 parts of the article (mistakes bound to new organizations, to environment, to organizational characteristics and to cognition and choice of the actors) and apply the relative content to main agents intervening in the democratization, to identify element of disconformity in their acting. Under Content I summarize the article’s findings, in Analysis I present a general view to introduce the personal view about individual Actors.

### 2.3.1 New organization

#### Content

As a general matter, new organizations are more likely to fail than established ones. This is due to absence of standard routines even in simple tasks, to increase possibility of internal conflicts among the participants, to inefficiency of the processes, to absence of ties with the public and to social relations not yet established. Power struggles are particularly damaging, and the result can be cooptation of parties and displacement of task.

#### Analysis

The aftermath of the Egyptian Spring is certainly a new situation for all political actors. Nothing similar had ever happened in the country, so that there are no repertoires of behavior, serving as inspiration for them in this situation. Most lessons about democratization can be taken from foreign countries, mostly not Arab and not Islamic, limiting therefore the adherence to standardization. New political choices are required, more time to analyze the situation was necessary for a better planning. The power remains concentrated in organizations that existed previously and favors displacement of the task to their own agenda. The paradox of dominant opposition being strongly centralized and ideologically conservative affects negatively the chance of successful transition.

#### Actors

**Army.** Although the army was given new powers inside the democratization process, it could rely on a strong structure and on richness of social interdependence. It was the force able to take the most advantage of the weakness of the other participants. By limiting internal and external conflicts, the army can be considered the abuser of the democratization process, *de facto* cutting short the ideals of the revolution and performing a reactionary role, first on the Tahrir exponents still protesting and later against the only force challenging their power, the Muslim Brotherhood.

**Muslim Brothers.** After calming internal conflicts by sidestepping the moderate voices, the Brotherhood went straight to take advantage of the inexperience of other possible contributors to the democratization process. The Brotherhood main mistake was trusting the SCAF, which would not be a mistake of its responsibility, but it did also acts of misconduct very similar to the army. Main misconduct of Morsi was having his own agenda and operating a displacement of the task, by aspiring not to a pure egalitarian democracy, but to a sort of theocracy under the control of reactionary forces and with a strong religious connotation.

**Judiciary and reactionary forces.** Judges and Courts were also adapting to the new, but not fully endorsing the change. The Constitutional Court for example did not recognize the risks of hindering Morsi and carries direct responsibilities on the political standoff that brought the system to paralysis in 2013. Other established economic powers supported the army and

backed its goal displacement, wishing to keep their privileges and eventually to take advantage of the fall of favor of the Mubarak's clan and new economic opportunities.

**Parliament and Constitutional Assembly.** The principal contributors to the democratic process should have been the new elected institutions, the Parliament and the Constitutional Assembly. This did not happen because of their little legitimacy and difficult role, since they were under too much Islamist influence and cornered by the army. They were also fought by the judiciary and not able to develop a direct relationship to the public. In this environment, the assemblies were given little chance to perceive and develop their own tasks. Timing and Constitution drafting turned out to be chaotic preventing the establishment of new balances and leadership, but it is hard to make the assemblies responsible.

**Revolutionaries.** Most people participating in the revolution did not have the skill and will to stay involved once protests turned into political game. The target of the protesters, were mainly creating a new political scene and not controlling it. The mistake was therefore in the lack of long term planning and in the inability to keep reactionary forces away from seizing the power, coopting some part of the population, and imposing antidemocratic rules.

### 2.3.2 Environment

#### Content

The author follows the new institutional approach of considering the cultural values and not the economic mechanisms as determining the way institutions are legitimated and then managed. In this view, the source of the mistakes of human agency are located in the cultural relations and social structures determining the process.

#### Analysis

One of the major issue to overcome in Egypt was the previous lack of democratic culture, due to long story of authoritarian regimes, only moderated in the recent decades by some opening to political opposition. Constructive political dialogue and parliamentary discussion of issues under the respect of opposition are the visible aspect of this mechanism. They did not set in properly in the Egyptian environment post Mubarak.

#### Actors

**Army.** The army sees itself as the guarantor of peace in Egypt and the population support its over-dimensioned role in economics and in keeping the social order. Not putting into question the legitimation of such an important power is a cultural issue that affected the democratization process in the country. When organizing elections, the army was clearly worried that the winner would limit this influence. The attempt to manipulate the process was a planned and conscious mistake, and therefore a case of misconduct. It is particularly serious due to the lack of transparency of the army and to their prejudice to some social forces, among them Muslim Brotherhood and leftist parties.

**Muslim Brothers.** They see themselves also as paladin of the society. They share also diffidence for newcomers and respect established forces instead. There was not a true opening to democracy and to revolutionary values by the FJP, the reformists were all expelled before the elections. Did Morsi try to game the system and put through the famous secret plan of the Brotherhood?<sup>53</sup> By knowing the answer, it would be possible to define the behavior of the Brothers in the process as mistake or misconduct.

**Judiciary and reactionary forces.** Reactionary forces are defined by “cultural” aspects and obviously would be tempering any democratic opening. Did they give the democratization forces a chance? Considering the protection that the courts gave and still give to the Sisi’s coup, there is little doubt on which stand the judiciary stood.

**Parliament and Constitutional Assembly.** Many of the limits of the elected assembly were due to the impossibility to push through a new political culture into an environment under dominance of reactionary forces.

**Revolutionaries.** Even if open to democracy, also participants to protests and then leaders of liberal parties can be considered victims of the lack of political culture. Their inability of reaching the power and of developing a dialogue with the people in charge has been an historical mistake for the democratization of Egypt. This situation has then determined the necessity of supporting the less dangerous enemy (initially Morsi and then Sisi) and challenging the system with continuous actions, like walkouts of assemblies, protests on the streets, boycotting, all strategies which ended up backfiring with Sisi’s coup.

### 2.3.3 Organization characteristic

#### Content

Under an organizational point of view, there are three way to approach an institution:

- static structural analysis: the structure of an organization is made by information, interaction and monitoring backbones.
- dynamic process: processes are made of formalities and can bring hegemony of intra- groups, causing wrong assumptions and lack of negative feedback.
- list of tasks: if the definition of occupation tasks is not clear, risks of mistakes come from roles and technologies not well defined and by tacit knowledge of participants.

#### Analysis

The democratization path is the project of our organization. The interaction of the political actors among them, their respect of formal rules and their management of information and feedback together with the adherence to the task they are supposed to fulfill, were key to success of the enterprise. On the contrary, many dysfunctional steps were part of the process, at all level, among them no time and wish to streamline the process, to design the rules and the tasks to maximize quality of output, to make transparency as rule for

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<sup>53</sup> see A. Pargeter (2010) page 67.

information management, to give honest and positive feedback. There was no coordinated effort of seeing a democratic Egypt like a new social structure made of new processes, new tasks, and a common vision. On the contrary, every party was fighting for the power and assumed all others would have acted like in the previous authoritarian state, based on control, cooptation and hegemonic behavior.

### **Actors**

**Army.** The army has been one of the main backbone of Egyptian society at least since the 1952 revolution, thanks to the depth of its social control, its huge economic interaction with society and to the monopoly of information and of monitoring all members of society. The SCAF fell into the danger of this position of force, by interpreting its own hegemony as a mandate for ruling and not for opening the political system. It modified the Constitution unilaterally and disposed of the agenda in line with formalities of the old system, making clear that the old structure was in place, with new actors taking over the old tasks.

**Muslim Brothers**<sup>54</sup>. The hegemony of hardliners inside the Brotherhood made of it an organization reproducing the abuses to liberty of the previous regime. The policies of *ikhwanization* of society to create a sort of theocratic regime, the radical and divisive rhetoric to back right wing Brothers, and dispose of them as a sort of militia, the insincere offer to the opposition to dialogue are example of sabotaging any democratization attempt. The unilateral support to the Constitution, the naming by Morsi of 90 new members of Parliament, and the pressure on the press to silent dissent are in line with a strategy of eliminating liberties and backing the old style of organization of public life.

**Judiciary and reactionary forces**<sup>55</sup>. Although not as protagonists, the secret services and security apparatus kept active in using privileged information and influencing the political process by selectively engaging the crowd protesting, with the only task of damaging opposite parties. The old structural approach of private deals of elites and new power was highlighted by the way the Constitutional assembly was dealing with all interest groups, instead of with elected representatives. The Constitutional Court declaring the Low Chamber as illegal could have been a sign that the judiciary was fighting the Brotherhood way of governing under Mubarak's style, but it later became clear, when it blocked new elections 2013, that the court was involved in political fights, not in democratization efforts.

**Parliament and Constitutional Assembly.** Both the Parliament and the Constitutional Assembly never had a chance to really develop a new organizational style. Even if members of the Chambers were sincerely dedicated to designing a new type of regime, no democratic structure could be set up. Both were subordinated to the Morsi Presidency and became the battlefield, where reactionary force fought their final battle.

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<sup>54</sup> see Trager (April 4<sup>th</sup> and 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2012), O. Roy (2012), Elmenshawy (November 30<sup>th</sup>, 2012), Kirkpatrick (April 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2012), Khalifa Isaac S. (2012), Hellyer (December 20<sup>th</sup>, 2012), POMEPS (January 11<sup>th</sup>, 2013).

<sup>55</sup> see Bellin (2012) POMEPS (January 11<sup>th</sup>, 2013), N. Brown (2012).

**Revolutionaries.** The revolutionary camp was also in a subordinated position and could not develop neither a leadership of the democratic process, nor a respected opposition to the elected institutions. Most political game was played outside the responsible assemblies and there was no level playing field where to develop the new formal and substantial aspects of an institution building environment. Even when united, the leaders of the democratic forces were snubbed by the army and by the Muslim Brothers.

### 2.3.4 Cognition, choice

#### Content

The fourth and final subject of the analysis goes deeper in the cognitive dimension of mistake. Social context, biased or partial cultural knowledge, cognitive limits to rationality are all elements that arise from the way individual minds elaborate institutionally determined behavioral expectations. Deviant corrective narratives, developed both individually and institutionally, legitimate mistakes by developing alternative visions. This way, limits to rationality join cultural factors to generate personal interpretation and misperception of realities, bringing up new framing and errors connected.

#### Analysis

We move on the cognitive dimension of the revolution and its aftermath. It would probably be the more delicate point to ascertain. It is the door of opening a more profound debate about the intentions of actors. Are public, parties and forces behind the scene ready to reframe own vision? Is the personal mistake of protagonists simply a wrong choice, or a misperception of the reality they were in, or was their behavior responsive to a narrative of the group they belong to?

#### Actors

**Army.** Already the decision of the army to let Mubarak fall can be read as a sign, that the army was led by a cynical, opportunistic and pragmatic approach to the revolution<sup>56</sup>. The ensuing deviant narrative of the SCAF shaped the whole subsequent phases. The timing and importance of elections, the private ownership of the Constitution, the calculated free space let to all other actors, the *ad hoc* alliances with every other contender (the Brothers, the reactionary forces, the judiciary at all level of Courts, *tamarrud*, the secret services) unveil a precise design of the new Egypt by the army, that did not look like a free democratic and open state, but a replica of the previous regime.

**Muslim Brothers.** One of the issues complicating the perception I have about the Muslim Brothers is that there are many different approaches inside the organization, from rigid and radical, to flexible and compromising<sup>57</sup>. With Morsi eliminating the moderate vision of al Fotouh, the Brotherhood took an ideological turn towards illiberal policies, already surfaced

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<sup>56</sup> see Bellin (2012)

<sup>57</sup> part of the historical conflict of vision between Qutb's *Milestones* and al-Hudaybi's "Preachers not Judges"

in 2007 by electoral program and political platform. There is no doubt, that the radical wing is not ready to compromise with Western values, has a dogmatic vision of the political and social life, and probably wish to set up a theocratic regime. It is impossible to judge, if this ideological position would hold on with the Brotherhood responsible for Egypt's government for along period of time, or there would be a moderation of the tones. If we accept though, that the movement itself will learn by analyzing its own mistakes, there is a chance that it will move away from such positions in the future.

**Judiciary and reactionary forces.** In 2005 when Kefaya and the judges protested against Mubarak, it seemed that the courts might become a revolutionary force. At that time, they protested particularly against the succession plan of Gamal Mubarak and against laws limiting the autonomy of the judges. During the 2011 revolution, it is hard to find signs of the judiciary courts to participate actively in a new configuration of the state based on democratic rules. They look constantly close to the army repressive force.

**Parliament and Constitutional Assembly.** As already seen in previous paragraphs, the elected legislative and constitutional assemblies did play a very marginal role in the process and it is not possible to identify cognitive mistakes in their acting.

**Revolutionaries.** After the failure, the revolutionaries had to reassess their cognitive approach to the role they played. The idea of simply bringing down Mubarak and then the democracy would come automatically turned out to be a huge mistake. On the contrary, in the second phase, the reactionary forces played a much more cunning and elaborated game and neutralized any effort of renewing institutions and political standards, taking advantage of a certain naivete of the revolutionary forces. The mistake came from misjudging the new political conflict and not realizing how important was to shape a realistic political framing of the whole democratization process, without leaving to hope and wishes the actual implementation of the desired output.

## Conclusions

As we have seen, the attempt to create a new state guaranteeing the Tahrir ideals of Bread, Freedom, Social Justice and Dignity failed for multiple reasons and due to various actors' behavior. The dream of a democracy, based on elections of strong representative assemblies, on a social pact generating a fair and moderate Constitution, on rule of law and independent powers crashed against a wall of economic hardship, lies and violence.

After the failure of the Egyptian Spring, Sisi precipitated the country into a spiral of bad news, rolling back a merciless rollback of dictatorship. In 2014 Freedom in the World, Freedom House's annual report on the condition of global political rights and civil liberties, reported a dramatic fall of Egypt's situation, 1300 political detainees were sentenced to death in unfair trials, the press was silenced and mistreated, human rights activists and foreign scholars prosecuted. There is no doubt the revolution has failed.

The result of this analysis is that many actors carry responsibility for the failure of the democratization of Egypt, but some more than others. The army definitely developed own narrative and agenda; the Brotherhood pursued private interests, although it was often cornered by adversaries and could not properly clarify its final intentions; the revolutionaries turned out as naïve and weak; the judiciary was surprisingly fully subordinated; all other forces did not play a relevant role.

After the failure of the process, Egyptians will hesitate to mobilize against the new authoritarian regime, to claim democratic rules, human rights and social, institutional and economic reform. This is a sad situation, but I see a more serious risk in the possibility that the important lessons of the Arab Spring can be lost or forgotten. The contribution of this piece of history to the theories of democratization must not be underestimated and the value they can add to future similar movements make its study an academic duty.

After my long and complex analysis there are many important deductions to be drawn and that can be useful in an Egyptian, Arab, Muslim or even new context. The democratization process can only work, if it is based on social dialogue and common effort of all parties involved. Power centers of the old system (army, judiciary, businesses and elites) must be the first one to be willing to give up some of their power and to wish to contribute to design a new society. The political process is a gradual and require a social dialogue, especially important in the Constitution writing process. Issues like timing of elections, transparency of parties involved, security on the streets, economic contingent plans for initial hardship, acceptance of freedom of press are all preconditions for effective democratization and cannot be neglected.

Muslim parties could be among the actors who can draw the most useful lessons, from this kind of analysis, hopefully learning from the mistakes of the FJP and getting ready to follow the steps of religious parties who accepted a clear democratic system, like the Christ Democrats in Europe after WWII and probably Ennahda in Tunisia.

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### Eidesstattliche Erklärung

Ich versichere hiermit an Eides statt, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbstständig verfasst, ganz oder in Teilen noch nicht als Prüfungsleistung vorgelegt und keine anderen als die angegebenen Hilfsmittel benutzt habe.

Sämtliche Stellen der Arbeit, die benutzten Werken im Wortlaut oder dem Sinn nach entnommen sind, habe ich durch Quellenangaben kenntlich gemacht.

Dies gilt auch für Zeichnungen, Skizzen, bildliche Darstellungen und dergleichen sowie für Quellen aus dem Internet.

Bei Zuwiderhandlung gilt das Seminar als nicht bestanden - keine Scheinvergabe.


Ich bin mir bewusst, dass es sich bei Plagiarismus um schweres akademisches Fehlverhalten handelt, das im Wiederholungsfall weiter sanktioniert werden kann.

30.11.2017

Marburg, den .....

Datum

Giacomo Aghina



Unterschrift